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THE CASE AGAINST IMPROPER MOTIVE
AND CIVIL IMMUNITY OF POLICE
William Whirl was arrested on suspicion of felony-theft in
September 1962 and booked in the Harris County, Texas jail. He
was indicted by the Grand Jury on two felony counts. On
November 9, 1962, the District Attorney of Harris County moved
by nolle prosequi to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the
prosecution had insufficient evidence on which to obtain and
sustain a conviction. The court approved the dismissal of the
indictment against Whirl and an order of dismissal was
dispatched to the jail. For some unknown reason, the jailer never
received notice of the dismissal, and Whirl was forced to extend
his stay in Sheriff Kern's hostelry for an additional eight plus
months. Upon his release, Whirl brought an action against the
Sheriff of Harris County, C.V. (Buster) Kern, claiming
deprivation of civil rights under Title 42 of the United States
Code, section 1983, and for false imprisonment under Texas law.
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of- Texas,
found for defendant Kern and on appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed
in favor of plaintiff Whirl. The Fifth Circuit's reversal was based
on their conclusion that a cognizagle claim under section 1983
only need show that defendant acted under color of law and that
as a result, the plaintiff was deprived of his civil rights. The court
heard but refuted defendant's claim that to recover, plaintiff must
show that defendant's act was improperly motivated. Sheriff
Kern's claim that plaintiff's continued detention was privileged by
good faith was not considered an adequate defense, as common
law tort principles of false imprisonment do not recognize an
unlawful detention as privileged even where good faith is
evidenced. Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).'
The purpose of this comment is: (1) to discuss the
significance of improper motive or reprehensible conduct as
applied to section 1983 and the exclusion of improper motive from
the substantive law; (2) to examine the defenses under section 1983
applicable to false arrest and false imprisonment; (3) to survey
some of the policy reasons behind the extension and limitation of
civil liability of police.
I. Certiorari was denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3173.
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I. Judicial Rejection of Improper Motive Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983
To bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 19832 for a false
imprisonment effected under color of state law, plaintiff must
plead that (1) defendant's acts were committed under color of
state law, statute, ordinance, custom or usage and, (2) as a result
of such conduct, plaintiff was deprived of rights secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States. Section 1983
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any state or Territory, subjects
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
The most significant case in interpreting federal jurisdictional
requirements for a claim under section 1983 based on false arrest
or imprisonment is Monroe v. Pape.3 The fact situation in
Monroe is analagous to Whirl and is fairly typical of section 1983
false arrest or imprisonment claims. Monroe's home was invaded
early one morning by Chicago police while the household was
sleeping. The police entered and forced the Monroes to stand
naked in the living room, while the officers searched the premises.
The police then arrested Monroe and detained him at the police
station for ten hours on open charges while they questioned him
concerning a murder which had occurred two days prior to his
arrest. The police had obtained neither a search warrant nor an
arrest warrant and never brought Monroe before a magistrate for
arraignment. He was subsequently released without any formal
charges ever being filed.4 The principal importance of Monroe is
that no other requirements were read into the statute and that it
was applied as stated. The Court was careful to note that
2. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-83 (1961) for a detailed analysis of the
legislative history of 1983.
3. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
4. Id. at 181-87. The court approves the interpretation of "under color of law" set
forth in a prior decision: "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
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"wilfully" did not appear in section 1983 and that any "gloss"
should not be added to the statute's meaning.5 To the contrary,
Justice Douglas's thrust was to read section 1983 "against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the
natural consequences of his actions." 6 It is perhaps unfortunate
that Whirl cited some courts as having held that the Civil Rights
Act is limited to reprehensible conduct.7 With one exception,8 such
a holding is not the law today.
In spite of the clear wording of the statute and its application
by Monroe and subsequent decisions, some of the federal circuits
have read into section 1983 the added requisite that the actor must
have had an improper motive or his act must reflect reprehensible
conduct. "The formulae suggested at times for distinguishing
causes of action which are cognizable in federal courts from those
which are not have usually required for a federal cause of action
facts indicating flagrancy or an improper motive."' The strongest
supporter of the reprehensible conduct prerequisite is the Sixth
Circuit. "This statute (1983) is aimed at reprehensible action on
the part of the defendant in the civil action authorized by it.""'
Such an uncodified requirement has been supported in the past by
a few federal district courts for the Southern District of California
and by the Seventh Circuit." The strongest judicial support for the
reprehensible conduct doctrine in the California district courts is
Beauregard v. Wingard.1
2
The court in Beauregard cites numerous cases which would
restrict tort liability to instances of "misuse" 3 of power or where
"bad"' 4 motive is apparent. However, the court did not decide or
hold that reprehensible conduct would be required for plaintiff's
claim to gain federal jurisdiction under section 1983. "We do not
decide in this opinion, nor have we need to decide, whether the
bare allegations defendants mention are sufficient to plead a cause
5. 365 U.S. at 187.
6. Id.
7. 407 F.2d at 787.
8. Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1962
9. Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 1968).
10. Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1963).
11. Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237, 240 (7th Cir. 1959). Note that this case is a pre-
Monroe decision.
12. 230 F. Supp. 167 (S.C. Cal. 1964).
13. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 229, 326 (1941).
14. Gager v. Bob Seidel, 300 F.2d 727, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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of action within 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 ... ."I' Instead the court
discussed reprehensible conduct as being relative to plaintiff's
ability to recover after federal jurisdiction had been attained.
"There is no question that an arrest by State officers without
warrant, without probable cause, not with a purpose of enforcing
the law, but with an ulterior motive, is an arrest without due
process."'1 6 In essence, the court was weighing defendant's motive
with his actions to see if the arrest was in fact privileged by
probable cause. Thus Beauregard did not seek to establish a third
prerequisite to section 1983 jurisdiction, but instead used
reprehensible conduct as a factor in determining whether the
arresting officer had probable cause to make the arrest. The court
held that probable cause would be recognized in cases where the
arrest had occurred due to the officer's "honest misunderstanding
of the law."'" Probable cause would not exist where the arrest was
made with an evil or malicious motive unconnected with law
enforcement. 8 Looked at in this light, despite the repetition of the
terms improper motive and reprehensible conduct in the court's
opinion and weighed in terms of Monroe and Ninth Circuit
opinions, the finding or failure to find such a motive would not
preclude plaintiff's admission to a federal forum. Instead, the
restrictions, if they are intended as such, would be limited to an
examination of the defendant's conduct as weighing on his defense
of probable cause. Lukewarm support is given the reprehensible
conduct argument in another California case, Raab v. Patacchia."1
However, the support is also limited to the due process argument
and not the original jurisdiction issue of section 1983. The court
held that plaintiff's claim could receive cognizance in a federal
court but his due process claim fell under defendant's probable
cause defense. Plaintiff's claim failed, not because he was unable
to prove that defendants' were improperly motivated, but because
his due process argument was founded on a technical infraction
committed by defendant police.20 Perhaps, the court concluded,
the strongest reason for dismissing plaintiff's claim would be to
apply the maxim de minimus non curat lex.21
15. 230 F. Supp. at 182.
16. Id. at 185, (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 184.
18. Id. at 183.
19. 232 F. Supp. 71 (S.D. Cal. 1964).




In the Ninth Circuit, and the few other jurisdictions that have
recognized "improper motive" as a consideration in a civil rights
claim, the basis of the argument has been limited to defenses and
not jurisdiction: Thus the Ninth Circuit has never limited a
section 1983 claim solely to one reflecting reprehensible conduct.
The Seventh Circuit has flatly rejected their pre-Monroe opinions
discussing the need for a malicious act.2 2 It is difficult to
understand how the reprehensible conduct/improper motive
prerequisite, which the court in Whirl examined at length, has
persisted to the present day. Not only did the Supreme Court
make it explicit in Monroe that an act committed "under color
of law" and a resulting deprivation of civil rights were all that
was needed for a section 1983 claim, but none of the California
cases cited as authority in fact hold that reprehensible conduct is
a prerequisite to such a claim. Of the three California district
cases relied on by defendants in Whirl, all three refute it entirely."
The California view "may now be regarded as established that a
specific intent to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights is
not a prerequisite to liability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983."24
The Ninth Circuit has apparently never considered the
language in Beauregard to be contra to the Monroe holding, since
Beauregard has never been repudiated. The overwhelming view of
the federal courts of appeal is that the Civil Rights Act is not
limited by a requirement 'for plaintiff to plead that the defendant's
acts were maliciously or improperly motivated. The Ninth Circuit
has continually reiterated the two requisites expressed in section
1983 and in the Supreme Court's analysis in Monroe. "The only
elements which need to be present in order to establish a claim
for damages under the Civil Rights Act are that the conduct
complained of was engaged in under color of state law, and that
such conduct subjected the plaintiffs to the deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the
United States."
22. Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1968).
23. Raab v. Patacchia, 232 F. Supp. 71, 73 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Beauregard v. Wingard,
230 F. Supp. 167, 182 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Selico v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D.
Cal. 1962).
24. Selico v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475,478 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
25. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 646 (9th Cir. 1962); Cohen v. Noris, 300 F.2d
24, 30 (9th Cir. 1962); Klor v. Hanson, 278 F. Supp. 359, 362 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Herbert
v. Morley, 273 F. Supp. 800, 801 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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IL Defenses to False Arrest and False Imprisonment
Besides its unique fact situation, Whirl v. Kern contains an
articulate analysis of the defenses which are and are not applicable
to the false imprisonment and false arrest claim. After federal
jurisdiction has been established, the plaintiff's claim of
deprivation of civil rights is based on federal and not state law."
The Supreme Court holds that in establishing a claim under 1983
for false arrest or imprisonment, the applicable law is the
common law of torts .2  A false arrest is accomplished when the
arrest is made without legal authority and without probable
cause.28 A false imprisonment is accomplished when the actor
acts, without legal authority, intending to confine the other
person, and his act directly or indirectly results in such a
confinement.29 To recover, plaintiff has the burden of showing that
the arrest or imprisonment was carried out without legal
authority. In most cases this pleading takes the form of stating
that plaintiff was arrested without a warrant and later released
without any charges being brought. Once plaintiff has established
the unlawful arrest or unlawful detention, he has made out a
prima facie case and the burden shifts to the defendant.to prove
that he was in some way privileged to act as he did.3 0 Normally,
26. Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 125 (5th Cir. 1963); Watkins v. Oaklawn
Jockey Club, 183 F.2d 440, 442 (8th Cir. 1950).
27. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). The court cites as authority the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) and I F. HARPER & F. JAMES JR.. THE LAW OF
TORTS (1956).
28. Rue v. Snyder, 249 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1966). Rue is an example of
personal vindictiveness combined with usurpation of the police power resulting in a loss
of personal rights and liberties. Defendant, an off-duty patrolman, was on a Sunday outing
in his car. He was towing his boat, and in maneuvering this long assemblage, managed to
outflank the car in which plaintiff was riding thus forcing plaintiff's daughter to drive
partially on the road shoulder to avoid hitting the defendant's boat. Plaintiff managed to
overtake and repass defendant in such a manner as to enable plaintiff to "let the defendant
know in rather colorful language that he did not think much of the defendant's driving
ability and he possibly embellished his view in this regard by questioning the defendant's
paternity." Id. at 741. The officer, not one to be taken advantage of, arrested plaintiff
and booked him in the local jail on charges of "disorderly conduct" and "public
drunkeness." Plaintiff posted a $20 bond and was released after four hours. He had an
immediate physical examination to show that he was not drunk nor could the court find
any evidence of drinking. In awarding plaintiff S650 in damages, the court concluded:
"The right of lawful arrest is too powerful a weapon and the right to freedom from
unlawful arrest is too weighty a shield to use the one or to sacrifice the other in settlement
of the exchange of a few angry words between motorists . Id. at 742.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965).
30. Lucero v. Donovan, 258 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Cal. 1966). Lucero is another glaring
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whether defendant meets the burden of proof establishing probable
cause is ascertained by the tryer of fact.3' The defenses of good
faith and probable cause that are available to officers in a
common law action for false arrest are also available to them in
an action against them under section 1983 .2
"The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical
conception affording the best compromise that has been found
for accommodating . . . often opposing interests. Requiring
more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less
would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the
officer's whim or caprice. '33
Good faith and probable cause afford the police official a great
deal of leeway in making an arrest without a warrant and without
causing him to "stake the financial security of his family upon a
snap determination. '3 The officer is privileged if a state of facts
exist that would lead a reasonable prudent person in the same or
similar circumstances to entertain a strong suspicion that the
person arrested was guilty.3'
The defenses available under false imprisonment differ
greatly from false arrest. Good faith and probable cause are not
cognizable defenses as the prima facie case consists of intent to
deprive the party of his freedom (good faith or malice are equally
culpable) without legal justification .3 Although broader privileges
example of official abuse of authority. Plaintiff, an American woman of Mexican descent,
was arrested for suspected possession of narcotics after her apartment was searched and
some pills confiscated. The police had neither an arrest warrant nor a search warrant nor
even probable cause as they had only gone to plaintiff's apartment for information
concerning a cousin of hers suspected of being a drug user. Plaintiff was questioned at the
police station, and despite her protestations, was subjected to a body cavity search
undertaken by two policewomen and witnessed by several male police officers. The officers
conducted the search even though there was a doctor present who could have conducted
the examination with less embarrassment to the plaintiff. The search produced no evidence
and the pill analysis revealed that the ingredients were non-narcotic.
31. Marland v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312, 314 (10th Cir. 1963).
32. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
33. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
34. Mathes & Jones, Police Immunity in Damage Actions, 53 GEo. L.J. 889, 913
(1965); Manos, Police Liability for False Arrest or Imprisonment, 16 CLEV-MAR. L. REv.
415, 427 (1967). Both law review articles are written by judges and are discourses in
support of non-liability of police officials on the basis that a failure to extend immunity
might result in lethargic law enforcement.
35. People v. Hillery, 65 Cal. 2d 795, 803, 56 Cal. Rptr. 280, 285, 423 P.2d 208, 213
(1967).
36. Parrott v. Bank of America, 97 Cal. App. 2d 14, 22, 217 P.2d 89, 94 (1950).
Good faith may be a defense to a false arrest that also results in false imprisonment.
1970]
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
and discretion have been extended to law enforcement officials in
making an arrest,3 7 the privileges for imprisonment are very
limited. Adequate legal authority and consent are the only
privileges to a jailer's false imprisonment." The jailer is protected
to the degree that his imprisonment of a person does not
constitute an instant tort "until the expiration of a reasonable
time for the proper ascertainment of the authority upon which his
prisoner is detained. '39 Jailers have been held liable for damages
where a prisoner was kept in jail beyond the term of his lawful
sentence."0 Lack of personal knowledge by the jailer that the
prisoner is held without lawful authority is not a complete defense
to an action for false imprisonment. 41 Failure to know of the
court's dismissal of charges or release is not, as a matter of law,
adequate legal justification. "Were the law otherwise, Whirl's
nine months could easily be nine years, and those nine years,
ninety-nine years, and still as a matter of law no redress would
follow. 4 A defendant to a false imprisonment charge cannot
avoid liability by pleading that plaintiff must allege and prove
negligence on defendant's part. There is no such thing as negligent
false imprisonment.43 Defendant may still be liable even though he
acted under the mistaken belief that he had a legal right to jail
plaintiff."4
Having established a prima facie case of false imprisonment,
plaintiff is justified in receiving a directed verdict." Where only
false arrest is an issue, the question of whether the arresting officer
had probable cause for the arrest is a question for the jury to
decide."6
However, the fact situation in Whirl is entirely different from that of an officer acting
under duress and making an arrest. Therefore the immunities of a false imprisonment
deriving from a false arrest will not be discussed.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121, comments b and c at 206 (1965).
38. Roberts v. Hecht Co., 280 F. Supp. 639, 640 (D. Md. 1968).
39. Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d at 792 (5th Cir. 1969).
40. Waterman v. State, 2 N.Y.2d 803, 159 N.Y.S,2d 702, 140 N.E.2d 551 (1957).
41. Garvin v. Muir, 306 S.W.2d 256, 258 (C.A. N.Y. 1957).
42. Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d at 792 (5th Cir. 1969).
43. Forgione v. United States, 202 F.2d 249, 252 (3rd Cir. 1953).
44. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 3.7 at 228 (1956).
45. Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d at 793 (5th Cir. 1969).
46. Marland v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312, 314 (10th Cir. 1963).
[Vol. 7
COMMENTS
IIL Extensions and Limitations of Civil Liability:
Policy Reasons
The topic of extending or limiting civil liability of police is
an extremely timely one, due to the tyrannic implications of the
term "law and order" and the increasing public discord over
related social and political issues; it deserves further elaboration.
Abundant criticism has been aimed at our law enforcement and
judicial systems concerning the frequent examples of sidewalk
justice resulting in the enforcement of "order" at the expense of
"justice. 47 Despite the'arousal of public concern, police
immunity has been judicially and legislatively endorsed in order
to uphold the "strong public interest in vigorous law enforcement.
' To impose liability, it is argued, would be to cause the
peace officer "at his peril to outguess what a later jury might
decide, for any substantial deterrent to vigorous law enforcement
might well have dangerous or even tragic consquences." 49 Where
the officer has had to make a split second decision whether to
make an arrest or not, he is definitely entitled to some privileges."
However, the officer is covered by extensive privileges, and the
elasticity of the privilege gauge is definitely in the officer's favor."
Where the officer makes an arrest without a warrant, he will not
be held civilly liable if he can establish that he had probable cause
and acted in good faith.
Even the issue of damages52 works in favor of the police
47. In addition to the cited studies, there are a profuse number of periodicals
published within the past eighteen months on the subject of police practices and abuses,
and suggesting the means of improving present methods of law enforcement. See, e.g.,
223 ATLAN., Mr. 1969, at 74-135; 208 NATION, Apr. 21, 1969, at 486-518; 381 ANNALS
125-58.
48. 5 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES 410
(1963).
49. Id. at411.
50. Quinnette v. Garland, 277 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1967); 53 GEo. L.J. 889
(1965).
51. 1 F. HARPER& F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 3.18 (1956).
52. Damages are measured by the federal common law, sounding in tort, and thus
both compensatory and exemplary damages may be awarded, Medlock v. Burke, 285 F.
Supp. 67 (D.C. Wis. 1968); Basista v. Wier, 340 F.2d 74 (C.A. Pa. 1965). Even where
actual damages are not established, nominal damages and punitive damages are
recoverable. Washington v. Official Court Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945 (D.C. Pa.
1966). An example of nominal damages being considered in a light most favorable to the
police officer-defendant is the Maryland decision of Mason v. Wrightson, 109 A.2d 128,
132 (C.A. Md. 1954). The judge, in an appellate reversal for plaintiff, found that plaintiff
had proven injuries resulting from an unlawful police arrest and false imprisonment. The
judge awarded plaintiff nominal damages and costs in the sum of one cent.
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officer. Judges tend to disallow the awarding of excessive damages
against police. Extensive research has revealed no case where any
police officer was forced to pay damages where the unlawfulness
of his conduct was not firmly established. The apparent reason,
and rightfully so, is that the court is not going to impose
monetary damages in questionable cases. Cases in which plaintiffs
have recovered are those where there is excessive abuse of the
police power. Case law illustrates that the courts are well aware
of the contributions of conscientious law enforcement officials and
have taken extra care in insuring that an officer is not unjustly
penalized. Some judges have even supported complete immunity
for police in order to avoid the financial burden a civil suit would
impose on the officer and his family. As a practical matter, any
discussion of civil immunity is academic as most police officers
are either covered by liability insurance or have it available.53
As to holding police civilly liable, the arguments are many.
Illegal arrests, and imprisonments, unfortunately, are not rare
occurrances. This fact is pointedly borne out by an extensive study
of the nation's police. "Although there is no legal basis for
arresting persons simply as a means of detaining them while an
investigation of their possible involvement in crime is conducted,
this has been a common practice in a number of departments.' '" 4
This type of illegal arrest is termed an investigative arrest, and
1966 statistics showed that 16 of the 55 police departments
responding to a federal survey admitted the use of investigative
arrests. 5 For example, in one large eastern city, "3,719 (6.6 per-
cent) of the 56,160 nontraffic arrests during 1964 were recorded
as arrests for investigation. ' 56 One estimate has placed the
number of annual illegal arrests at between two and three and one
half million.57 A recent New York study reveals some interesting
statistics. Of 441 complainants who alleged abuse by police, 81
were fully authenticated.5 The largest percentage of the New York
53. PRES'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 31 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REI'ORT]. See also
note 34, supra.
54. Id. at 186.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L,
REV. 493 (1955).
58. P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY 285-86 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as CHEVIGNY]. Mr. Chevigny's book represents a two year study of the
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complaints concerned either assault by an officer or false arrest.
The cases reported are truly depressing as they reveal countless
callous and seemingly pointless examples of abuse of authority. 9
The constitutional rights of every citizen to be free from the
unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty and to be free from
physical assaults are too great to sacrifice for the sake of
economic security of law enforcement officials. Civil remedy in
tort has never proven to be an excessive financial burden on the
police, while official abuses .in the form of physical mistreatment
and detention are well documented. Civil liability in tort is not
intended to operate as a panacea for police malfeasance. It neither
Police Practices Project of the Defense and Education Fund of the New York Civil
Liberties Union. There were no prerequisites for submitting complaints and so these figures
are limited to those people who sought assistance from the NYCLU and does not
adequately represent the actual number of persons who may have had real grievances. The
"authentication" statistics do not accurately reflect the percentage of valid complaints
as these statistics were limited to the cases that received judicial decisions in favor of the
complainant. Categorized, the statistics are:
Total Complaints Authenticated
Assault by officer 87 10
Assault with false arrest 77 18
False arrest 69 17
[illegal] Search-house 25 11
[illegal] Search-outdoors 27 7
Entrapment 6
Frame 34 3
Unlawful confession 9 -
Misuse of firearm 14 7
Improper identification 4
Wire tap 2
Not permitted to talk to attorney 8 1
Racial slur 8 1
Detention w/o charge 5 3
Discrimination 3 3
59. Several of Mr. Chevigny's observations are very illuminating and agree with
similar observations drawn from other studies of police abuses. He believes that officers
will sometimes exert far greater force than necessary or even make an unwarranted arrest
in order to assure that the public realizes that the police intend to fully enforce the law.
Id. at 276-83. A similar observation was made in the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
53, at 179-80. Another, and even more disturbing conclusion of Chevigny's is that the
police may use an arrest as a cover for their own excesses. Id. at 141-43. If an officer
physically attacks a person and does not arrest him, the officer will be in a difficult
position if the person later files a complaint for the officer will have a difficult time
justifying the attack. However, if the officer makes an arrest on a minor charge, he can
excuse his conduct on the basis that the victim resisted arrest. Then the burden of proving
false arrest and assault is on the victim. Minority groups, both racial, ethnic, and
monetary, are the most vulnerable to this type of abuse, especially where the victim has a
prior police record as his credibility as a witness in his own behalf is more suspect.
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seems desirable nor effective." Instead, such liability is only meant
to help compensate the complaining party for his injuries. Thus,
there is no sound reason, either in terms of the common law or
as a matter of policy, for disallowing civil recovery for the injured
party.
IV. CONCLUSION
The intent of this comment has been to discredit the rationale
behind improper motive/reprehensible conduct as a prerequisite to
recovery under section 1983. Not only does such a prerequisite fail
to have any statutory support, but the cases cited as supporting
it either do so only indirectly or as a policy basis for extending
police immunity to all situations except those where actual malice
or malfeasance is present. That this theory is no longer acceptable
has been borne out by the lack of any recent case articulating this
argument and by the cases that pointedly face the issue and refute
it, such as Whirl v. Kern.
As a matter of policy, it would seem more logical to refrain
from taking measures that would foster civil immunity. The police
officer clearly has adequate legal support to protect him from
liability. The burden of pleading and proving is on the party
alleging the false arrest or imprisonment and, with the former, the
officer has the viable defense of probable cause. The courts, well
aware of the tremendous burden placed on the police, view the
reasonableness of the action in a light most favorable to the
police. As long as the police have acted prudently and with
reasonableness, they need not fear being burdened with the
payment of money damages. However, it is in the situation where
60. Id. at 181; CHEVIrNY, supra note 55, at 255. The imposition of greater tort
liability on police officers is not an effective check on police abuses. At best it provides
the injured with some degree of compensation while not alleviating the source of the abuse.
All law enforcement agencies have administrative procedures for enacting disciplinary
measures against their officers. Unfortunately the procedure is often arbitrary and
infrequently utilized. A positive step toward curtailing police abuses would be the
incorporation of civilian review boards to work in conjdnction with the police's own
complaint and public relations centers. The greatest advantage to some form of civilian
review, assuming that the review boards would have concrete power to enact curative
measures if official abuses were disclosed, is that it provides an unbiased check or balance
on the police itself. The citizenry at large is interested both in the enforcement of the law
and in recognizing the exemplary achievements of our police officials. The citizenry is also
concerned with the quick recognition of questionable practices and their elimination and




the police do not act reasonably that remedies need be made
available. The opportunities for abuse and the value of personal
freedom are too great to allow the police total immunity from
civil suits. It is not enough to belatedly release the wrongfuly
imprisoned, as in Whirl, with no greater compensation than the
reassuring knowledge that administrative mistakes do happen.
Instead, the burden should fall, not on the innocent deprived of
his rights, but on the actor responsible for that deprivation.
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